Abstract. The availability of fast and reliable Digital Identities is an essential ingredient for the successful implementation of the public-key infrastructure of the Internet. All digital identity schemes must include a method for revoking someone's digital identity in the case that this identity is stolen (or canceled) before its expiration date (similar to the cancelation of a credit-cards in the case that they are stolen). In 1995, S. Micali proposed an elegant method of identity revocation which requires very little communication between users and veri ers in the system. In this paper, we extend his scheme by reducing the overall CA to Directory communication, while still maintaining the same tiny user to vendor communication. We contrast our scheme to other proposals as well.
Public-key cryptography encompasses digital signatures and public-key encryption. A digital signature scheme is a triple of algorithms, a key generation algorithm which generates a public key and a secret key, the signing algorithm and the veri cation algorithm. The signing algorithm uses the public and private key to generate a signature for an arbitrary document. The veri cation algorithm uses just the public key to verify the signature of a document. The speci cations require that all signatures generated with the valid secret key are veri ed by the veri cation algorithm; and, without the private key it is computationally infeasible to generate a signature for a (previously unsigned) message which the veri cation algorithm would accept. Public-key encryption is also a triple of algorithms, a key-generation algorithm which produces private and secret keys an encryption algorithm and a decryption algorithm. Anyone, given the public key can encrypt a message using the encryption algorithm, but only those who have the secret key can e ciently decrypt. For formal de nitions and further details see 13, 3, 4] .
When using public-key cryptography over the Internet, the main issue is the ability to associate the right public-keys to the right individuals/organizations. The overall strategy for doing so is as follows. In its simplest form, we assume one or more trusted Certi cate Authority (CA) centers which initially run the signature key generation algorithm to compute its own public and secret keys. Each CA holds its secret key under great security but widely distributes (say, publishes in NY-Times) its public key (or uses some other method to \bind" the public key to the CA). Now, any entity, who wishes to establish its digital identity with this CA, rst generates its own public-key/private-key pair. Then, it submits its public key along with its name and other required identifying informationto this CA. The CA checks the name and identifying information and if satis ed signs the public key and the name of the individual along with some subset of the identifying information, including expiration date a serial number, and possibly other information. (The amount of identifying information and the scrutiny of the information checking establish the level of trust with which a public key is \bound" to the identi ed entity.) Now, any user can verify that a message came from this individual by verifying both the signature of the message against a given public key and also verifying that this public key together with the right name and the valid expiration date are properly signed by CA. The above simple scheme extends to various hierarchies of CA structures (such as Federal Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) hierarchy, banks, company-internal CA, etc.) where a user will belong to many such hierarchies 14] . (See also 15] and references therein for more general structures.) For all these schemes, no matter what the structure is, one of the main bottlenecks is the issue of revocation. THE MAIN BOTTLENECK: When a public-key, together with an expiration date, is signed by a CA, there remains a risk. That is, a user's private key and certi cate may be stolen/compromised, or a company's private key and certicate may be retained by a former employee. Without a method for certi cate revocation, these keys may be used by unauthorized parties. Just as with creditcards, occasional revocation is a fact of life. According to some estimates, about 10% of public keys will usually be revoked before they expire 9]. Thus, an important element of any CA scheme (or hierarchy) is its revocation procedure.
Notice, that with revocation, the above simple setting becomes more involved, since now to verify that some public key is valid, one must not only check that it has been signed by the proper CA, but also that is has not been revoked. (Moreover, in case of CA hierarchy, one must certify that the CA public key has not been revoked either). Thus, the de nition of one's identity depends on the revocation rules in an essential way. In this paper, we extend an elegant method of S. Micali 9,10] of doing revocations. Before we explain our approach, let us review the design objectives and previous work done on this issue.
THE SETTING: Our setting is the one identical to 9]. We review it here. We consider some nite universe of users. The setting consists of one or several trusted certi cate authorities, which distribute, at regular intervals (for example, each day), information regarding revoked certi cates to several untrusted directories D. (The reason for having many directories is to allow replication of data) For each day, any directory should be able to provide a proof whether any user's u public key is valid or revoked. Of course, we insist that the directory (which is untrusted) can not cheat and change revocation status for any user. The proof of the revocation status the Directory can provide either to user himself (who can then pass it along to any vendor or any other user who wishes to check that the user's identity is still valid). The critical costs of the scheme are of course the size of the proof of the validity of user's identity (i.e., this proof should be as small as possible, since this is the most frequently used operation,) as well as the communication from Certi cate Authority to the Directories for each period.
PREVIOUS WORK: We brie y discuss some of the earlier work done on this problem. Previous to our work, three possible revocation strategies were proposed: the \centralized on-line solution"; Certi cate Revocation Lists (see, for example, 16]) and Micali's proposal and patent 9,10]. Independent of our work, two other schemes by Kocher 6] and Naor and Nissim 11] have been proposed. We review all these schemes below and point out the di erences.
In the centralized on-line solution, similar to credit-cards, there is a CA trusted central database, which maintains the status of all public-keys that have not expired. The user, in order to verify that a public-key has not been revoked makes a query to this central database, and receives an answer. The answer must be authenticated, either implicitly by use of a private network, with a CA signature, or with CA private-key authentication, provided that the CA shares with this user a private authentication key. This centralized solution has several drawbacks: the CA must be accessed for the veri cation processes on-line (or risk using revoked public-key) and its answer must be authenticated (to prevent man-in-the-middle attacks of somebody impersonating to the CA).
The centralized on-line solution is not acceptable in many cases, and thus a distributed solution is sought. One such solution is the so-called Certi cate Revocation List (CRL) (see, for example, VeriSign 16] ). In this approach the CA composes a list, say each day, of all keys thus far revoked and signs this list. This list along with the CA's signature of the list is the CRL for that day. Each day the CA sends the CRL to all the untrusted revocation directories all over the network. To verify a public key certi cate, the veri er rst checks the expiration date. If the certi cate has not expired it contacts any directory for that day's CRL. If the public key does not appear in the CRL it is still valid. This solution is better than the centralized solution, since now many sites maintain the CRL list, and every such site, instead of maintaining the status of all public-keys must only maintain a list of revoked public-keys, where typically R, the number of revoked keys is much less than the number of keys N. The drawback is that the proof that some key is still valid is the entire CRL list, signed by the CA.
In 1995 Micali proposed a scheme in which a veri er needs only a small number of additional bits beyond a user's signature and the user's public key certi cate and only a small amount of extra computation to insure that the user has not been revoked 9, 10] . In this scheme, Micali uses the idea of o -line/online signatures 2], which in turn builds on the work of Lamport 7] . The basic idea is as follows. Let f be a one-way permutation which is easy to compute but hard to invert (in practice, MD5 or other hash-functions are used). Now, for each user, u, the CA picks a random x u and computes y u = f(f(f f(x u ))), where f is applied, for example, for 365 times to compute y u . This y u is called user u's \0-token." For each user the CA includes the user's 0-token along with the users public key, and expiration date and other certi cate information in its signed certi cate. Now, after the rst day, for each user u whose public key has not been revoked that day, the CA releases user u's \1-token", f ?1 (y u ), to the directories in the network (which is can compute from x u or from cached intermediate values of f i (x u )). Note that, given a 0-token for a user u it is easy to check whether a candidate token is a 1-token for user u, but computationally infeasible to compute a 1-token for user u. To verify on the second day that the public key of a user u was not revoked on the rst day, a veri er gets a candidate token from a directory or a candidate token from the user (who retrieved it already from a directory). The veri er then checks whether the candidate is a 1-token for the user. In general, if u's certi cate is not revoked up through day i, the CA provides u's i-token, f ?i (y u ), to the directories. Veri er on the i+1st day check whether candidate tokens are i-tokens for users. The advantage of the scheme is that communication between a directory and a user (or veri er) is small and need not be authenticated. If a given protocol calls for the user to retrieve the day i-token from the directory then the token remains a short certi cate for day i + 1 that user has not been revoked. In addition, verifying a day i-token is less expensive then verifying the signature of a CRL. The disadvantage is that the scheme requires (for each day) the CA to send N ? R tokens to each directory where N is the number of public keys and R is the number of revoked keys. Micali also considers (as in our setting) the case where a directory may act maliciously by not forwarding the day i-token of a user it received from the CA to the user or veri er. A non-revoked user could thus be considered revoked by a veri er. To prevent this Micali modi es his scheme as follows. For each user the CA also chooses a random x 0 u , the \revocation token," and includes f(x 0 u ) in u's certi cate, along with the 0-token and other certi cate information. When u's public key is revoked the CA sends the revocation token to the directories. When a directory is queried about a user on day i + 1 it must return either the day i-token or the revocation token for that user.
Recently, Naor-Nissim 11] have improved upon a scheme of Kocher 6] . We will describe the requirements of their scheme. For the details of the scheme see 11]. For R revoked keys, in the Naor-Nissim scheme the CA maintains an authenticated 2-3 tree of hash values of depth O(logR). For each public key which is revoked in an update period, the CA must update this special tree by computing O(log R) new hash values. As long as one key is added to this revocation tree the root must be recomputed and signed. The CA sends to the directories the lists of users to insert and delete, and a signature of the root. The directories insert and delete the users from the tree, recompute the hash values and check the signature of the root. When a user queries a directory concerning the revocation status of a key, the directory sends O(logR) hash values and the signature of the root. To verify the revocation status of a key, a user must compute O(log R) hash values, compare them in a speci ed way with the hash values from the directory and verify the signature of the root hash value. In summary, the CA to Directory communication of Naor-Nissim scheme is superior to our scheme (as well as Micali's scheme) but the veri cation of the revocation status of the user (or vendor) is smaller for Micali scheme and our scheme.
OUR RESULTS: We will build on Micali's scheme 9,10] to maintain its advantage of e cient veri cation. Recall that in Micali's scheme every user's certi cate contains one 0-token. In order for the user to remain unrevoked on day i + 1 the CA must publish the i-token associated with the user's 0-token. In our scheme the CA will incorporate k 0-tokens into the certi cate for each user rather than just one, where k will be a parameter of our scheme. The sets of 0-tokens for the users will be distinct, however, the sets may intersect substantially. The rule for remaining unrevoked will now be slightly di erent. In order for a user to remain unrevoked on day i+1 the CA need only publish an i-token associated with one of the user's 0-tokens. Since the sets of 0-tokens may intersect, one i-token may act as a certi cate of non-revocation for many users. Thus the CA may not need to publish N ? R tokens when R keys have been revoked as in Micali's scheme.
For example, we show that if the number of 0-tokens in each certi cate is logN, and the sets of 0-tokens in each user's certi cate are selected properly, then the number of tokens a CA must publish during an update period is R logN=R.
In this paper we insist that the proof from user to vendor of the validity of user's ID remains very small, as in Micali's scheme. For the scheme of NaorNissim, this is not the case (i.e., while 11] substantially save on the CA to Directories communication over 9], their proof of validity is bigger). In this paper, we study the tradeo between the number of 0-tokens needed in a certi cate and the number of tokens a CA must publish per update period. We summarize our results (and compare it to Micali's scheme) below. Note that N stands for the number of not-yet-expired certi cates, R stands for number of revoked certi cates, and c is a parameter in the general scheme, typically a constant. Notice that if the number of revocations is small our scheme is faster then Micali's approach. However, even if the number of revocations is large, and in fact for any value of R, 0 R N we show that the information update cost is better then the above table indicates, and in fact is always smaller then N ? R of Micali's scheme. In practical settings, both our hierarchical scheme and our general scheme with c = 3 provide savings in communication compared to the Micali's approach. (For example, for the hierarchical scheme, with 10% revocation rate we gain 2:7 multiplicative factor improvement, and for 1% revocation rate we gain 14:9-fold improvement over Micali's communication from CA to Directories, while still required a single hash-value (i.e. 128 bits) proof of the validity of one's identity. For the generalized scheme with c = 3 we get 2:9-fold improvement for the 10% revocation rate and 19-fold improvement for 1% revocation rate) If the percentage of revoked users is smaller then the savings are more substantial. We should remark here that Micali's method to avoid malicious directories by including one extra token in each certi cate applies to our scheme as well and we will not explicitly include this in the description of our scheme.
In the Naor-Nissim scheme 11], the communication from CA to Directories is smaller then our scheme and Micali's scheme. However, both Micali's scheme and our scheme, the directories need only send one token (of 128 bits) in response to a query about any key.
Paper outline: In the next section we describe our scheme and prove a bound of R logR=N on the number of tokens the CA must send the directories. In Section 3 we describe a generalization of our scheme which requires the CA to send asymptotically fewer tokens to the directories using a novel complement cover construction. (We believe that this construction is of independent interest, and might be useful for other purposes as well.) In Section 4 we describe a variant of our scheme which includes an incremental feature. That is, if some public key is revoked on day i, we do not have to pay for this on the following days (i.e. we pay for each revocation only once.) We now proceed with the details of our scheme.
2 Hierarchical Scheme
Description of the Scheme
For concreteness, we will assume that certi cates are valid for D days and that certi cates are revoked once per day. Let f be a one-way permutation from n bits to n bits. Consider the following sequence: (r; f(r); f 2 (r); : : :; f D (r)) where r is a uniformly chosen n bit string. We will call this the chain of r and denote it by c r . We will index this sequence in reverse order and starting from 0. That is, the 0th element of the sequence,c r (0), is f Note it is easy to verify whether a token is an i-token of a chain once the 0-token (or a j-token, 0 j < i) of a chain is known. Simply compute f i ( ) (f i?j ( )) and check for equality with the 0-token (j-token). However, by the properties of a one-way permutation, given any number of the j-tokens of a chain, 0 j < i, it is computationally infeasible to compute the i-token of the chain.
Before we describe our revocation scheme it will be useful to review Micali's revocation scheme. In the Micali scheme, for each user v there is a random n bit string r v and a chain c rv . For notational simplicity we will hereafter refer to this as the chain of v and denote it by c v . In this scheme the 0-token of v, c v (0), is incorporated into the certi cate of v which is signed by the CA. If user v has not been revoked up to and including day i then the CA will issue the i-token of v in response to queries about the status of user v's certi cate. Otherwise, the CA will not issue an i-token.
To verify that signer v has not been revoked up to and including day i, a veri er must have v's certi cate and a candidate i-token for v which he obtains from either the CA, a directory, or v (who had previously obtained it from the CA or a directory). He accepts that v has not been revoked up to and including day i if is veri ed to be the i-token of v.
We will now describe our rst and simplest scheme for revocation. For simplicity we will assume that the number of users N = 2 l is a power of 2 and that all users are issued certi cates at the beginning of day 1. (We remark that these assumptions can be relaxed. We introduce them here for the clarity of exposition.) Each user is given an l bit id v 2 f0; 1g l . We associate these ids with the leaves of a labeled complete binary tree of height l in the natural way. That is, label the root by the null string , and label its two children by 0 and 1. Given any node in the tree whose label is a binary string s of length less than l, label one child with s0 and the other with s1. For each node u in this tree the CA computes a chain c u . The CA's Update Operation: Let R i be the set users which have been revoked at some point up to and including day i. At the end of day i, the CA will calculate a subset of nodes of the labelled tree, called the day-i veri cation nodes with the following two properties.
1. For every v = 2 R i , there is at least one node of the path of v which is a day-i veri cation node.
2. For every user r 2 R i , none of the nodes on the path of r is a day-i veri cation node.
For each node which is a day-i veri cation node, the CA can compute (or has cached) the i-token of that node. Call the collection of all such i-tokens the day-i veri cation tokens.
The CA sends the day-i veri cation tokens to the directories. A Directory's Query Response: In response to queries on day i + 1 concerning user u, if u has not been revoked through the end of day i, then at least one node on the path of u is a day-i veri cation node. The directory issues the i-token of one such node. This i-token is, by de nition, a member of the day-i veri cation tokens. If u has been revoked, no node on the path of u is a member of the day-i veri cation nodes and, hence, the directory cannot issue an i-token. The Veri er's Operation: A veri er v must verify both the signature of a signer u and u's certi cate. This certi cate contains the path of 0-tokens of u. We assume that the veri er has retrieved u's certi cate and a candidate i-token, , from either the signer, the CA, or a directory. He accepts that u has not been revoked up to and including day i if is veri ed to be an i token of one of the nodes on the path of u.
By property 1 of the day-i veri cation nodes, for a non-revoked signer u, an i token of one of the nodes on the path of v will be available for the veri er and the veri er will thus accept v.
By property 2 of the day-i veri cation nodes, and the de nition of oneway permutation, it is computationally infeasible for a revoked user, u, or any accomplice to deliver a token to the veri er which the veri er will accept as being an i-token of a node on the path of u. Calculating the Day-i Veri cation Nodes Given a set of revoked users R i , the CA can calculate the day-i veri cation nodes by operating on the labelled tree as follows. First, mark as \revoked" every node in the path of every revoked user. Now, the day-i veri cation nodes consists of all non-revoked nodes which are children of a revoked node. It is easy to verify that this set satis es the two properties above and moreover, that it is the minimal set which satis es these two properties.
As an example, suppose that none of the users have been revoked on day one, then the set of day-1 veri cation tokens consists of a single token: the 1-token of the root. Since this 1-token is on every users' path of 1-tokens, a veri er which is given this token will accept every user.
As another example, suppose that the user denoted by the string of all 1s is revoked the 1st day. The day-1 veri cation tokens consists of the 1-tokens of the l nodes 0; 10; 110; : ::; 11 110. It is easy to verify that this set can be used to accept all but the revoked user.
In the next section we analyze the size of the set of veri cation nodes as a function of the number of revoked users.
Size of the Set of Veri cation Nodes
In this section we derive an upper bound on the number of day-i veri cation nodes (and hence the number of day-i veri cation tokens) as a function of the number of nodes which have been revoked up to and including day i. Let N denote the number of users and r be the number of revoked users. tree for N users when the set of revoked users (leaves) is R. Let T(N; r) = max jRj=r T(N; R). We will assume that N is a power of 2. We now prove the following. are the nodes at depth k in the labelled tree. These trees have height l ? k. We de ne the family of revoked setsR as follows.R, for jRj = r, is inR if there is exactly one revoked user ofR in each of the subtrees of height l ? k.
By our previous analysis for one revoked user in a tree, for anyR 2R each subtree of height l ? k requires l ? k veri cation nodes. Note that no other veri cation nodes are required. Hence, for anyR 2R, the total number of veri cation nodes, T(N;R), is just r(l ? k) = r log N=r. We will now show that for any set R = 2R, that T(N; R) < r log N=r. Actually we will prove the stronger statement in the lemma below. We will use the following de nition. To see this note that for the set R the subtree was covered by one veri cation node at the root of the subtree. However, the number of veri cation nodes in the subtree after u is added to the revoked set is h. u t Lemma 3. Let R, for jRj 2 be the set of revoked leaves and consider a minimal subtree containing exactly two elements of R of height h 0 . Let u be one of the two elements. Then T(N; R ? fvg) = T(N; R) ? (h 0 ? 2).
To see this note that in R the subtree has 2h ? 2 veri cation nodes whereas R ? fvg it has h veri cation nodes.
We will prove the Lemma 1 by induction. That is, we will show that for any R with jRj = r and s R 1, there is an R 0 with jR 0 j = r such that s R 0 = s R ? 1 and T(N; R) T(N; R 0 ) ? 1. Clearly, the lemma will then follow. u t observing that by construction, the number of veri cation nodes is never more than the number of non-revoked users. The number of tokens the CA needs to issue after r users have become revoked is at most T(N; r) in our scheme, and hence, this is at most the number of tokens the CA needs to issue in the Micali scheme which is N ? r. For small r there is a large gap between the number of tokens which need to be issued in both schemes. For example, if r = N=64 (i.e., a revocation rate of approximately 1.5%), then N ?r = (63=64)N is larger than T(N; r) (6=64)N by almost a factor of ten.
Generalized Hierarchical Scheme
In this section we will rst describe a set-theoretic object we call a complement cover family. We will then show that it properly captures the idea of assigning tokens to the non-revoked users. Finally, we will describe several complement cover families which thus yield constructions for the revocations problem.
Complement Cover Families
Consider a universe U of size N. Let R be any subset of U and let S and F denote families of subsets of U. Let R = U ? R denote the complement of R. De nition 2. S is a complement cover of R i
De nition 3. F is a complement cover family of U i for every subset R of U, F contains a complement cover of R. That is, for every subset R of U, there is a subset S of F such that S is a complement cover of R,
We will see below that for all of our constructions of a complement cover family F, for every subset R of U, there is a unique subset S of F which is a complement cover of V . We will call such families unique complement cover families.
For any unique complement cover family F, and every subset R of U, let CC F (R) denote the unique complement cover of R which is contained in F. Furthermore, denote the function F as the size of the complement cover of F which is de ned as follows: F (r) = max R2U;jRj=r jCC F (R)j.
For every complement cover F and every element of u 2 U, de ne H F (u) as the sets in F which contain u. Let h F (u) = jH F (u)j denote the height of u in F. By abuse of notation, de ne the height of F, h F as max u2U h F (u). Note that if u = 2 R then the intersection of CC F (R) and H F (u) is not empty, otherwise it is empty. This follows from the de nition of a complement cover family.
We will now show how a unique complement cover family can be used as a data structure for certi cate revocation. Let U be the set of users and F a unique complement cover family of U. The CA creates a chain for each set S of In addition the veri er retrieves a candidate i-token, , from either the signer, the CA, or some other source. He accepts that v has not been revoked up to and including day i if is veri ed to be one of the i-tokens of H F (v). By the de nition of the complement cover of R i , for a non-revoked user v one of the i-tokens of H F (v) will be available for the veri er and the veri er will thus accept v. In addition, by the de nition of one-way permutation, it is computationally infeasible for a revoked user or any accomplice to deliver a token to the veri er which the veri er will accept as being an i-token of H F (v).
Since unique complement cover families are useful as revocation data structures we are interested in nding a family F of U such that 1. jFj is O(N c ) for some small constant c, i.e., number of chains required in the system is practical. 2. h F is small, i.e., the number of 0-tokens in the certi cate of every user is small. 3. The complement cover of every set, CC F , can be e ciently computed. 4. The size of the complement covers, F ( ) as a function of the size of the revoked users is small.
Example Complement Cover Families
We consider two extreme, but simple, solutions for this problem : . Thus, the solution is obviously not practical because the size of the certi cates and the CA's data structure is exponential.
These two families stand at two opposite poles -the rst family has small size and small h F but a large F , and the second family has a small F but large size and large h F . Below we will describe a scheme which has the advantages of both of the above.
Description of General Scheme
We will now describe a construction for a unique complement cover family which is parameterized by integer c 2. The complement cover of a revoked set R, CC F (R), can be computed as follows. As in the hierarchical scheme, rst mark as revoked each singleton set whose sole member is a member of R. In Fig. 1 these sets are denoted by an asterisk. Then mark as revoked each subset of F which is a superset of any of these marked sets. In the graph representation, start by marking the revoked leaves. Then mark the immediate supersets of the marked leaves. Continue working up the graph until every superset of a marked set has been marked. In Fig. 1 , the marked sets are marked with an asterisk. The elements of CC F (R) are the maximal subsets of F which have not been marked. In Fig. 1 , they are circled. These elements are easy to nd. For each set of siblings at a given level in which at least one of the sets, but not all, is marked as revoked do the following. If exactly one of the siblings is not marked, it is a member of CC F (R). For example, node f3g in Fig. 1 which is the union of the unmarked siblings. For example, node f4; 5; 6; 7; 8;9g
in Fig. 1 . This set is a member of CC F (R). The size of the complement covers is given by F (r) r log c N=c k ? m r log c N=r ? c k . This can be shown using methods similar to those for the hierarchical scheme.
It is instructive to instantiate the scheme for several values of c. ). Note that there is a 50% increase in size of F compared to the Hierarchical scheme, but more than a 50% decrease in (since log 3 = 1:585). So, it could be an alternative to the Hierarchical scheme. 
Incremental Version
Under the current scheme, if r 1 users are revoked on day 1 and r 2 users are revoked on day 2, the number of day 2 veri cation nodes is a function of r 1 whereas the number of day 3 veri cation nodes is based on r 1 + r 2 although the number of users revoked the previous day was only r 2 . We propose the following modi cation to our scheme such that the number of veri cation nodes needed for a given day depends only on the number of users revoked the previous day and not on all of the users revoked thus far.
For the rst modi cation we replace each chain of tokens of length 365 with a hash tree of depth 2 365, analogous to 8, 5] . The root value of the hash tree becomes the 0-token. There is one such hash tree and 0-token associated with every node in the labelled tree of N elements. On day i, for each node v in the day-i veri cation set, the CA gives the log(2 365) + 1 hash values needed to compute the path from leaf 2i in the the hash tree to the 0-token associated with the node v. Call this the day-i veri cation path for node v.
Note that given the day-j, for 1 j < i, veri cation paths for node v, it is computationally infeasible to compute the day-i veri cation path for v. This motivates our second modi cation to the scheme. Recall that each user's certi cate contains logN 0-tokens, one for each node in the labelled tree on the path from the user's id to the root. Previously, for a user to be veri ed on day i, the veri er would a need a day-i veri cation path for one of the user's 0-tokens. We change the protocol as follows. On day i, the CA computes the day-i veri cation set of nodes in the labelled tree using just the users revoked the previous day. The CA sends to the directory a day-i veri cation path for each node in the day-i veri cation set. Now, for a user to be veri ed on day i, the veri er will need a day-1 through day-i veri cation path with the additional property that the root of each of the veri cation paths is contained in the set of 0-tokens in the user's certi cate.
This scheme reduces the CA to directory communication costs substantially. It can be shown that the average daily cost is proportional to at most (R=365) log(365N=R) where R is the total number of revocations throughout the year. Of course, this reduction is gained at the expense of a larger communication requirement for the veri er which is proportional to i for day i. This latter communication requirement can be reduced to log365 by requiring the CA to produce incremental veri cation paths for the log 365 times scales of 2 days, 4 days, 8 days, etc. This only increases the average daily communication cost of the CA by a factor of 2.
